Kernel Antivirus Bridge for PHDM/SCBE
Status: active implementation (policy bridge)
Code: agents/kernel_antivirus_gate.py
Tests: tests/test_kernel_antivirus_gate.py
What this is
kernel_antivirus_gate is the SCBE policy engine for kernel telemetry events. It is designed to sit between:
- event producers (eBPF/Falco, ETW, minifilter, Sysmon),
- and enforcement points (allow, throttle, quarantine, kill, honeypot).
It reuses current SCBE components:
- Threat membrane:
agents.antivirus_membrane.scan_text_for_threats - Domain turnstile:
hydra.turnstile.resolve_turnstile - Enemy-first thresholds used in extension gating
Security-as-cells model
The gate applies immune-style state transitions:
HEALTHY: normal flow (ALLOW)PRIMED: elevated monitoringINFLAMED: friction increase (THROTTLE)NECROTIC: hard containment (HONEYPOT+ isolation)
State derives from three signals:
suspicion(content + integrity + geometry blend)antibody_load(time-decayed suspicion memory)membrane_stress(geometry boundary pressure)
Linux adapter (Falco/eBPF) - implemented
Bridge module:
agents/linux_kernel_event_bridge.py
CLI monitor:
scripts/linux_kernel_antivirus_monitor.py
Adapter responsibilities:
- parse Falco JSON (
output_fields) into normalizedKernelEvent - map
evt.typeto SCBE operation classes (exec,open,write,network_connect, etc.) - carry antibody load per process key (
host:pid:process) across events - emit SCBE containment decisions in JSONL
Run:
# from live stdin feed
falco -o json_output=true | python scripts/linux_kernel_antivirus_monitor.py --input - --alerts-only
# from replay file
python scripts/linux_kernel_antivirus_monitor.py --input artifacts/falco_events.jsonl --pretty
Event schema
Input (KernelEvent) includes:
- process identity (
pid,process_name,parent_process) - operation (
exec,module_load,process_inject, etc.) - target path/resource
- signer/hash integrity (
signer_trusted,hash_sha256) - optional geometric signal (
geometry_norm)
Output (KernelGateResult) includes:
- SCBE decision (
ALLOW,QUARANTINE,ESCALATE,DENY) - immune cell state
- turnstile outcome
- kernel action (
ALLOW,THROTTLE,QUARANTINE,KILL,HONEYPOT)
Why this fits PHDM/SCBE
- Keeps user friction low for clean workloads.
- Pushes friction and containment to hostile trajectories.
- Maintains continuity with existing turnstile math and domain policy.
- Lets kernel enforcement remain simple while SCBE policy evolves in Python/TS.
Run tests
pytest -q tests/test_kernel_antivirus_gate.py
pytest -q tests/test_linux_kernel_event_bridge.py